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Abstract
For an infinite-horizon continuous-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential
discounting, we look for an optimal equilibrium, which generates larger values than any other
equilibrium does on the entire state space. When the discount function is log sub-additive and
the state process is one-dimensional, an optimal equilibrium is constructed in a specific form,
under appropriate regularity and integrability conditions. While there may exist other optimal
equilibria, we show that they can differ from the constructed one in very limited ways. This
leads to a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of optimal equilibria, up to some closedness
condition. To illustrate our theoretic results, comprehensive analysis is carried out for three
specific stopping problems, concerning asset liquidation and real options valuation. For each
one of them, an optimal equilibrium is characterized through an explicit formula.
MSC (2010): 93E20, 91G80.
Keywords: optimal stopping, time inconsistency, non-exponential discounting, optimal equi-
libria, consistent planning.
1 Introduction
Consistent planning in Strotz [24] has been a widely-accepted approach for time-inconsistent prob-
lems, when a decision maker (an agent) lacks sufficient control over his future selves’ behavior. It
is a two-phase procedure. First, the agent should find out the strategies that he will actually follow
over time (Phase I). Formulated as subgame perfect Nash equilibira in subsequent literature, these
strategies are constantly called equilibria. Next, the agent needs to, according to [24, p.173], “find
the best plan among those he will actually follow” (Phase II).
In finite-horizon discrete-time models, an equilibrium can be found through straightforward
backward sequential optimization, as detailed in Pollak [21]. It is in fact the unique equilibrium,
as observed in [16] and [1]. Phase I is consequently done, and there is no need of Phase II. By
contrast, once we deviate from either the finite horizon or the discrete-time structure, consistent
planning becomes highly nontrivial. In infinite-horizon discrete-time settings, ad hoc constructions
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are used to prove the existence of a few specific equilibria; see e.g. [20], [19], and [8]. In continuous-
time settings, equilibria are characterized through a system of nonlinear equations, proposed in [7]
and [3]. This has aroused vibrant research in mathematical finance, such as [6], [9], [26], and [4],
among others. Solving this system of equations is, however, difficult; even when it is solved (as in
the special cases in [7] and [3]), we only obtain one particular equilibrium. In other words, as it
currently stands, Phase I is only partially done, with finding all equilibria a remaining challenge.
Phase II, on the other hand, has not been addressed at all. It is worth noting that, as opposed
to finite-horizon discrete-time models, multiple equilibria may exist, as shown in [20], [1], [16], and
[7]. How to select one appropriate equilibrium to use is then a genuine problem.
Huang and Nguyen-Huu [10] recently developed an iterative approach for Phase I of consistent
planning. For stopping problems, [10] constructed a fixed-point iteration that can easily generate a
large class of equilibria. When the state process is one-dimensional, Huang, Nguyen-Huu, and Zhou
[11] further established that every stopping strategy converges to an equilibrium via the fixed-point
iteration, which facilitates the search for all equilibria. This approach has been applied to stopping
problems under non-exponential discounting in [10], and extended to a probability distortion setting
in [11].
In this paper, we take up the framework in [10], and focus on Phase II of consistent planning.
Specifically, we investigate an infinite-horizon continuous-time stopping problem in which an agent
maximizes his expected payoff, under non-exponential discounting, by choosing an appropriate time
to stop a one-dimensional continuous Markov process X, taking values in an interval X ⊆ R.
An optimality criterion for equilibria, demanded by Phase II, has hardly been explored in the
literature. Here, we propose that an equilibrium is optimal if it generates a larger value than any
other equilibrium does, at every state x ∈ X; see Definition 2.3. This criterion is rather strong: in
economic terms, it requires a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to be dominant on the entire state
space, a rare find in game theory. We, nonetheless, establish the existence of an optimal equilibrium
R∗, given in the specific form (4.11); see Theorem 4.1, which is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.1 hinges on several crucial conditions. First, the discount function is required to
be log sub-additive, i.e. satisfy (2.3) below. This in particular captures decreasing impatience, a
well-documented feature of empirical discounting in Behavioral Economics and Finance; see the
discussion below (2.3) for details. Second, a “diffusive condition”, i.e. Assumption 4.1, is imposed
on the state process X. It serves to ensure that whenever X reaches the boundary of a Borel
subset R of X, it is diffusive enough to enter R immediately. This allows us to restrict our attention
to only closed equilibria (see Section 4.1), with no need to deal with other equilibria of possibly
pathological forms. A large class of diffusion processes are shown to satisfy Assumption 4.1; see
Remark 4.2. Finally, we need (4.2) and (4.3) as the appropriate long-run limiting and integrability
conditions for our stopping problem. When (4.3) is violated, an optimal equilibrium in general may
not exist; see Proposition 6.4 and Remark 6.2 for details.
A natural ensuing question is whether the optimal equilibrium R∗, established in Theorem 4.1,
is actually the unique one. This is not true in general: in Example 5.1, we construct explicitly R∗
and another optimal equilibrium T ∗, with R∗ properly contained in T ∗. Despite the possibility of
multiple optimal equilibria, if we impose closedness requirement for equilibria, we observe that each
closed optimal equilibrium can only differ from R∗ is very limited ways, as detailed in Corollary 5.2.
Moreover, a reasonable sufficient condition is proposed in Theorem 5.1 for R∗ to be the unique closed
optimal equilibrium. This condition can be verified in many practical stopping problems, including
those studied in Section 6.
To illustrate our theoretic results, comprehensive analysis is carried out in Section 6 for three
specific examples: (i) the stopping of a Bessel process, (ii) the stopping of a geometric Brownian
motion, and (iii) an American put option written on a geometric Brownian motion. Each of these
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examples describes a problem of real options valuation or asset liquidation, and the corresponding
optimal equilibrium R∗ is characterized through an explicit formula. Another contribution of the
analysis here is that it shows how R∗ can be found and characterized, even when some of the
conditions in Theorem 4.1 actually fail. Indeed, as shown in Section 6.2, one can introduce a
related auxiliary stopping problem for which Theorem 4.1 is applicable.
It is worth noting that in a discrete-time setting, Huang and Zhou [12] also establish the
existence of an optimal equilibrium, for an infinite-horizon stopping problem. Compared with [12],
our current continuous-time setup is much less amenable. For instance, there is no need in [12]
to carefully differentiate closed equilibria from other equilibria, as every equilibrium is closed in
discrete time, under mild continuity assumptions. Moreover, the discrete-time structure leads to
the uniqueness of optimal equilibria, which saves [12] all the endeavor we make in Section 5. For a
detailed comparison between the present paper and [12], see Section 5.1.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of our stopping problem, the
formulation of equilibria, and the optimality criterion for equilibria. Section 3 presents a useful basic
result, relying only on condition (2.3), which readily reveals the form of an optimal equilibrium.
Section 4 establishes the existence of an optimal equilibrium R∗. It is shown in Propositions 4.1
and 4.2 that a countable intersection of closed equilibria is again an equilibrium, which is the key
to deriving the main result Theorem 4.1. Section 5 studies how another optimal equilibrium T ∗ can
differ from R∗, and proposes a sufficient condition, in Theorem 5.1, for R∗ being the unique closed
optimal equilibrium. Section 6 contains detailed analysis of three specific stopping problems.
2 The Setup and Preliminaries
Consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) that supports a time-homogeneous continuous strong Markov
process X = (Xt)t∈[0,∞), taking values in some interval X ⊆ R. Let B(X) denote the collection of
Borel sets in X. Let F := (Ft)t≥0 be the P-augmentation of the filtration generated by X, and T be
the collection of all F-stopping times. For each x ∈ X, we denote by Px (resp. Ex) the probability
(resp. expectation) conditioned on X0 = x ∈ X. Also, we write Xx for X to emphasize its initial
value X0 = x.
Consider a payoff function f : X→ [0,∞), assumed to be continuous. Also consider a discount
function δ : [0,∞) → (0, 1], assumed to be non-increasing, continuous, and satisfy δ(0) = 1 and
δ(t)→ 0 as t→∞. The classical optimal stopping problem is formulated as
sup
τ∈T
Ex[δ(τ)f(Xτ )]. (2.1)
Here, we allow τ ∈ T to take the value∞: we take δ(τ)f(Xxτ ) := lim supt→∞ δ(t)f(Xxt ) on {τ =∞};
this is in line with Karatzas and Shreve [14, Appendix D]. It is well-known from standard literature
(e.g. [14, Appendix D] and Shiryayev [23]) that under fairly general conditions, for any initial state
x ∈ X, there exists an optimal stopping time τ˜x ∈ T for (2.1). It is then natural to ask whether
optimal stopping times obtained at different moments, such as τ˜x at time 0 and τ˜Xxt at time t > 0,
are consistent with each other. Specifically, (2.1) is said to be time-consistent if for any x ∈ X and
t > 0, we have
τ˜x(ω) = t+ τ˜Xxt (ω) for a.e. ω ∈ {τ˜x ≥ t}. (2.2)
This condition, in general, only holds for δ(t) := e−αt for some α > 0. When δ is a general
non-exponential discount function, Huang and Nguyen-Huu [10, Section 2] analyze in detail the
involved time inconsistency. Intuitively, the failure of (2.2) means that the optimal stopping time
we find today, τ˜x, need not be optimal in the future. Our future self at time t > 0 is tempted to
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employ τ˜Xxt , optimal to him at time t, instead of sticking with the previously-determined τ˜x. This
is problematic: although a maximizer τ˜x of (2.1) can be found, it will not be carried out by our
future selves. In the end, the supremum in (2.1) may not be attained, due to time inconsistency.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that the discount function δ satisfies
δ(s)δ(t) ≤ δ(s + t), ∀ s, t > 0. (2.3)
This particularly captures decreasing impatience, a well-documented feature of empirical discount-
ing in Behavioral Economics and Finance; see e.g. [25], [18], and [17]. As detailed in [22], de-
creasing impatience amounts to steeper discounting for time intervals closer to the present. Note
that (2.3) covers non-exponential discount functions that induce decreasing impatience, such as
δ(t) := 1/(1 + βt) for β > 0 (hyperbolic), δ(t) := 1/(1 + βt)k for β, k > 0 (generalized hyperbolic),
and δ(t) := λe−r1t + (1− λ)e−r2t for r1, r2 > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1) (pseudo-exponential). For a detailed
exposition, see the discussion below [10, Assumption 3.12].
As mentioned in Introduction, Strotz [24] proposes consistent planning as a way to resolve time
inconsistency: an agent should take into account his future selves’ behavior, and find a stopping
strategy that once being enforced, none of his future selves would want to deviate from. Such
strategies, called equilibria in the literature, will be precisely formulated below.
2.1 Formulation of Equilibria
As observed in [10], under time inconsistency, since one may re-evaluate and change his choice of
stopping times over time, his stopping strategy is not a single stopping time, but a stopping policy
defined below.
Definition 2.1. A Borel measurable τ : X→ {0, 1} is called a stopping policy.
Given any current state x ∈ X, a stopping policy τ governs when the agent stops: he stops at
the first time τ(Xxt ) yields the value 0. Note that this definition, taken from [10, Definition 3.1],
can be equivalently stated using Borel sets in X. Indeed, by definition,
τ : X→ {0, 1} is a stopping policy ⇐⇒ τ(x) = 1Rc(x) for some R ∈ B(X). (2.4)
Here, τ and R admit the relation R = {x ∈ X : τ(x) = 0}. Hence, the game-theoretic formulation
in [10, Section 3.1], stated in terms of stopping policies τ , can be recast using Borel sets R.
Specifically, to resolve time inconsistency, the agent needs to take into account his future selves’
behavior, and find the best response to that. Suppose the agent initially planned to take R ∈ B(X)
as his stopping policy. Now, at any state x ∈ X, the agent carries out the game-theoretic reasoning:
“assuming that all my future selves will follow R ∈ B(X), what is the best stopping strategy today
in response to that?” The agent today has only two possible actions: stopping and continuation.
If he stops, he gets f(x) immediately. If he continues, given that all his future selves will follow
R ∈ B(X), he will eventually stop at the moment
ρ(x,R) := inf{t > 0 : Xxt ∈ R} ∈ T .
This leads to the expected payoff
J(x,R) := Ex[δ(ρ(x,R))f(Xρ(x,R))]. (2.5)
By comparing the payoffs f(x) and J(x,R), we obtain the best stopping strategy for today
Θ(R) := SR ∪ (IR ∩R) ∈ B(X), (2.6)
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where
SR := {x ∈ X : f(x) > J(x,R)},
IR := {x ∈ X : f(x) = J(x,R)},
CR := {x ∈ X : f(x) < J(x,R)}.
(2.7)
Here, SR, IR, and CR are called the stopping region, the indifference region, and the continuation
region, respectively. In particular, on IR, the agent is indifferent between stopping and continuation
as they yield the same payoff. There is then no incentive for the agent to deviate from the original
stopping strategy R ∈ B(X). This gives rise to the term IR ∩R in (2.6).
Definition 2.2. R ∈ B(X) is called an equilibrium if Θ(R) = R. We denote by E the set of all
equilibria.
Remark 2.1. Under current context where X is time-homogeneous, (2.6) is simply a re-formulation
of (3.6) in [10], using the relation (2.4). Consequently, Definition 2.2 is simply a re-statement of
[10, Definition 3.7], thanks again to (2.4).
Remark 2.2 (Existence of an equilibrium). The entire state space X is an equilibrium. Indeed, for
any x ∈ X, since ρ(x,X) = 0, we have J(x,X) = f(x). This implies IX = X, and thus Θ(X) = X.
The general methodology for finding equilibria is the fixed-point iteration introduced in [10]:
one starts with an arbitrary R ∈ B(X), and apply Θ to it repetitively until an equilibrium is reached.
The next result is a direct consequence of [10, Theorem 3.16] and (2.4).
Proposition 2.1. For any R ∈ B(X) such that R ⊆ Θ(R), we have Θn(R) ⊆ Θn+1(R) for all
n ∈ N. Moreover,
R0 := lim
n→∞
Θn(R) =
⋃
n∈N
Θn(R)
belongs to E.
2.2 Optimality of an Equilibrium
Finding equilibria is only the first phase of consistent planning in Strotz [24]. In the second phase,
the agent should choose the best one among all equilibria. This requires certain optimality criterion
for an equilibrium, which has not been addressed in the literature.
For each R ∈ E , define the associated value function by
V (x,R) := f(x) ∨ J(x,R), for all x ∈ X.
Definition 2.3. Rˆ ∈ E is called an optimal equilibrium, if for any R ∈ E,
V (x, Rˆ) ≥ V (x,R) ∀x ∈ X.
This is a strong criterion for optimality, as it requires dominance of Rˆ over R at every x ∈ X.
Another way to interpret Definition 2.3 is that, similarly to classical optimal stopping in (2.1), we
aim to solve
sup
R∈E
V (x,R). (2.8)
What differs from classical optimal stopping is that we are not satisfied with solving (2.8) for
each x ∈ X. Instead, we intend to find one single Rˆ ∈ E that solves (2.8) simultaneously for all
x ∈ X. This uniform dominance on the entire space X is necessary to avoid another level of time
inconsistency.
The main goal of this paper is to show that, while the optimality criterion is rather strong, an
optimal equilibrium does exist.
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3 The First Result
We observe that (2.3) already implies that an R ∈ E generates larger values than any T ∈ B(X)
containing R.
Lemma 3.1. For any R ∈ E and T ∈ B(X) with R ⊆ T ,
J(x,R) ≥ J(x, T ) ∀x ∈ X. (3.1)
Proof. Fix x ∈ X. For simplicity, we will write v = ρ(x,R) and τ = ρ(x, T ). With R ⊆ T , we have
τ ≤ v. Consider the event A := {ω ∈ Ω : τ < v}. Observe that
J(x,R) = Ex [δ(v)f(Xv)1A] + E
x [δ(v)f(Xv)1Ac ]
= Ex [Ex [δ(v)f(Xv) | Fτ ] 1A] + Ex [δ(τ)f(Xτ )1Ac ]
≥ Ex [δ(τ)Ex [δ(v − τ)f(Xv) | Fτ ] 1A] + Ex [δ(τ)f(Xτ )1Ac ] , (3.2)
where the inequality follows from (2.3) and f being nonnegative. The strong Markov property of
X implies that
Ex [δ(v − τ)f (Xv) | Fτ ] 1A = EXxτ
[
δ(ρ(Xxτ , R))f
(
Xρ(Xxτ ,R)
)]
1A = J(X
x
τ , R)1A. (3.3)
Also note that Xxτ /∈ R on the event A. Since R is an equilibrium, we deduce from (2.6) that
f(Xxτ ) ≤ J(Xxτ , R) on A. (3.4)
By (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4), we conclude that
J(x,R) ≥ Ex [δ(τ)J(Xτ , R)1A] + Ex [δ(τ)f(Xτ )1Ac ]
≥ Ex[δ(τ)f(Xτ )1A] + Ex [δ(τ)f(Xτ )1Ac ] = J(x, T ).
Lemma 3.1 leads to the intriguing observation: for equilibria, the smaller the better.
Corollary 3.1. For any R, T ∈ E with R ⊆ T , V (x,R) ≥ V (x, T ) for all x ∈ X.
At first glance, it is intuitively puzzling how an equilibrium R can possibly dominate any
larger equilibrium that contains R, on the entire state space. In fact, Corollary 3.1 simply reflects
decreasing impatience in decision making (recall the discussion below (2.3)).
To see this, consider two rewards at time t and time t + s, respectively, with t, s > 0. If the
agent at time t prefers the second reward over the first one, note that this time-t preference is kept,
and actually amplified, at time 0, under decreasing impatience. Recall that decreasing impatience
amounts to steeper discounting for time intervals closer to the present. To the agent at time t, the
interval under consideration [t, t + s] is essentially [0, s], so he discounts steeply on this imminent
interval when comparing the two rewards. By contrast, to the agent at time 0, the interval [t, t+ s]
is further down in the future, so he discounts less steeply on this interval when comparing the two
rewards. Hence, if the second reward is more valuable than the first one under steeper discounting
(i.e. in the eyes of the agent at time t), it must be more valuable than the first one, to a greater
extent, under flatter discounting (i.e. in the view of the agent at time 0).
Now, take two equilibria R and T . If R ⊆ T , ρ(x, T ) ≤ ρ(x,R) for all x ∈ X. For x ∈ R,
since ρ(x, T ) = ρ(x,R) = 0, we have f(Xxρ(x,T )) = f(X
x
ρ(x,R)) = x. The agent at the state x ∈ R
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is then indifferent between R and T , as they yield the same immediate payoff. For x /∈ R, the
fact that R is an equilibrium indicates f(Xxρ(x,T )) ≤ J(Xxρ(x,T ), R) = Ey[δ(ρ(y,R))f(Xρ(y,R))], with
y := Xxρ(x,T ). That is, to the agent at the state y = X
x
ρ(x,T ), the reward obtained from reaching R
(i.e. the second reward) is more valuable than that obtained from reaching T (i.e. the first reward).
As discussed above, decreasing impatience stipulates that the agent at the initial state x /∈ R has
the same preference, i.e. R is preferred over T at x /∈ R. Therefore, we conclude that the smaller
equilibrium R is preferred over (or at least no worse than) the larger one T , at every x ∈ X.
A candidate optimal equilibrium can already be deduced from Lemma 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. If R˜ :=
⋂
R∈E R is an equilibrium, then it is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. By definition R˜ ⊆ R for all R ∈ E . If R˜ is an equilibrium, we can conclude from Lemma 3.1
that for any R ∈ E , J(x, R˜) ≥ J(x,R), and thus V (x, R˜) ≥ V (x,R), for all x ∈ X. Thus, R˜ is an
optimal equilibrium.
For R˜ :=
⋂
R∈E R to be an equilibrium, two technical issues have to be resolved: (i) Is the
intersection of two equilibria again an equilibrium? (ii) If (i) is true, can it be generalized to an
uncountable intersection of equilibria? In particular, how do we ensure that R˜ is Borel, given that
it is an uncountable intersection of Borel sets? Section 4 below is devoted to these questions, and
eventually establishes the existence of an optimal equilibrium.
Before heading to the detailed analysis in Section 4, we point out a straightforward consequence
of Proposition 3.1 that is already useful for some stopping problems.
Corollary 3.2. If ∅ is an equilibrium, then it is an optimal equilibrium.
Example 3.1. Let X be a geometric Brownian motion, given by
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt, (3.5)
where µ ∈ R and σ > 0 are constants, and W is a standard Brownian motion. The state space is
X = (0,∞). Consider the hyperbolic discount function
δ(t) :=
1
1 + βt
t ≥ 0, (3.6)
where β > 0 is a constant, as well as the payoff function f(x) := x for x > 0. Under current
setting, (2.5) becomes
J(x,R) = Ex
[
Xρ(x,R)
1 + βρ(x,R)
]
, for x > 0, R ∈ B(X). (3.7)
Define
ν :=
µ
σ2
− 1
2
, (3.8)
and recall that for any x > 0,
lim
t→∞
Xxt
1 + βt
= lim
t→∞
x exp
(
νσ2t+ σW (t)
)
1 + βt
=
{
∞, if ν > 0;
0, if ν ≤ 0. (3.9)
For ν > 0, (3.9) implies J(x, ∅) =∞ > f(x) for all x > 0. This shows that ∅ ∈ E and V (x, ∅) =∞
for all x > 0. Thus, ∅ is an optimal equilibrium, which confirms Corollary 3.2.
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4 Existence of an Optimal Equilibrium
For each x ∈ X, consider the running maximum X and the running minimum X of the state process
X, i.e.
X
x
t := max
s∈[0,t]
Xxs and X
x
t := min
s∈[0,t]
Xxs , t ≥ 0.
We impose the following condition on X.
Assumption 4.1. For any x ∈ X, Px[X t > x] = Px[Xt < x] = 1 for all t > 0.
Remark 4.1. For any x ∈ X, consider T xx := inf{t > 0 : Xxt = x}, the first revisit time to the
initial value x. A direct consequence of Assumption 4.1 is that T xx = 0 P
x-a.s.
The purpose of Assumption 4.1, intuitively speaking, is to ensure that “whenever X touches the
boundary of R, for any R ∈ B(X), it will enter R immediately”. This property will play a crucial
role in Section 4.1. Note that Assumption 4.1 is not very restrictive, since it already covers a large
class of diffusion processes, as explained below.
Remark 4.2. A one-dimensional Brownian motion obviously satisfies Assumption 4.1; see e.g.
Problem 7.18 on p. 94 of [13]. This can in fact be generalized to a much broader class of diffusion
processes. Specifically, let X satisfy the dynamics
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dBt,
where B is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion, and µ, σ are real-valued deterministic
functions such that σ(·) > 0 and ∫ t0 θ2(Xxs )ds < ∞ Px-a.s. for all x ∈ X and t ≥ 0, where
θ(·) := µ(·)/σ(·). If the process
Zt := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
θ(Xs)dBs − 1
2
∫ t
0
θ2(Xs)ds
)
, t ≥ 0
is a martingale, [11, Lemma 3.1] shows that X satisfies Assumption 4.1.
4.1 Closed Equilibria
In this subsection, we will show that Assumption 4.1 allows us to restrict our attention to only
closed equilibria. For any R ∈ B(X), R denotes the closure of R.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds. For any R ∈ B(X),
ρ(x,R) = ρ(x,R) Px-a.s. ∀x ∈ X.
In particular, ρ(x,R) = ρ(x,R) = 0 Px-a.s. for all x ∈ R.
Proof. Fix x ∈ X. If x is an interior point of R, by definition ρ(x,R) = ρ(x,R) = 0. If x ∈ ∂R,
there are two cases.
• Case I: There exist {xn}n∈N in R such that xn → x. For Px-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, Assumption 4.1 implies
that {Xxs (ω) : s ∈ [0, ε]} must intersect {xn}n∈N, for all ε > 0. This implies ρ(x,R) = 0 Px-a.s.
Since ρ(x,R) ≤ ρ(x,R) by definition, we get ρ(x,R) = ρ(x,R) = 0 Px-a.s.
• Cases II: x is an isolated point of R, i.e. x ∈ R and there exists ε > 0 such that (x−ε, x+ε)∩R =
{x}. By Remark 4.1, T xx = 0 Px-a.s. It follows that ρ(x,R) = 0, and thus ρ(x,R) = 0, Px-a.s.
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Finally, if x /∈ R, consider the random variable Y := Xx
ρ(x,R)
. For any ω ∈ Ω, since X is a continuous
process, Y (ω) ∈ ∂R. From the analysis above, we have PY (ω)[ρ(Y (ω), R) = 0] = 1. By the strong
Markov property of X,
Px
[
ρ(Xρ(x,R), R) = 0
∣∣∣ Fρ(x,R)] (ω) = PY (ω)[ρ(Y (ω), R) = 0] = 1, for Px-a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Taking expectation on both sides yields Px[ρ(Xρ(x,R), R) = 0] = 1. It follows that ρ(x,R)(ω) =
ρ(x,R)(ω) + ρ(Xx
ρ(x,R)
, R)(ω) = ρ(x,R)(ω) for Px-a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Lemma 4.1 admits several useful implications.
Remark 4.3. Under Assumption 4.1, for any R ∈ B(X), since ρ(x,R) = ρ(x,R) Px-a.s. ∀x ∈ X,
by definition J(x,R) = J(x,R), and thus V (x,R) = V (x,R), ∀x ∈ X. Moreover, with J(x,R) =
J(x,R) for all x ∈ X, (2.7) shows that SR = SR, IR = IR, and CR = CR.
Remark 4.4. Under Assumption 4.1, observe that R ⊆ Θ(R), for all R ∈ B(X). Indeed, for any
x ∈ R, since ρ(x,R) = 0 Px-a.s. (Lemma 4.1), we have J(x,R) = f(x), i.e. x ∈ IR. It follows
that R ⊆ IR, and thus
Θ(R) = SR ∪ (IR ∩R) = SR ∪R. (4.1)
This, together with Proposition 2.1, gives a desirable result for finding equilibria: under Assump-
tion 4.1, every R ∈ B(X) converges to an equilibrium via the fixed-point iteration. Specifically,
E =
{
lim
n→∞
Θn(R) : R ∈ B(X)
}
.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds.
(i) For any R ∈ E, SR = ∅.
(ii) For any R ∈ B(X), R ∈ E if and only if R ∈ E.
Proof. (i) Fix R ∈ E . For any x ∈ X, if x ∈ R, then ρ(x,R) = 0 Px-a.s. (Lemma 4.1), which implies
J(x,R) = f(x), i.e. x ∈ IR. If x /∈ R, then x /∈ R = Θ(R) = SR ∪R, thanks to R ∈ E and (4.1). It
follows that SR = ∅.
(ii) For any R ∈ E , by Remark 4.3 and (i), SR = SR = ∅. In view of (4.1), Θ(R) = SR ∪R = R,
i.e. R ∈ E . By switching the roles of R and R, we can prove that R ∈ E implies R ∈ E .
Lemma 4.2 (ii) and Remark 4.3 convey an important message: to compare different equilibria
in terms of their associated values, it suffices to restrict our attention to closed equilibria. After all,
the closure of R ∈ E remains an equilibrium, with the same values. In fact, R and R induce the
same stopping behavior, as SR, IR, and CR in (2.7) stay intact after we take the closure of R.
This additional closedness condition is the key to improving an equilibrium in a systematic
fashion, as we will introduce now.
4.2 Intersections of Equilibria
Under appropriate integrability conditions, we show that the intersection of two closed equilibria
is again an equilibrium, with larger values.
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Proposition 4.1. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds. Assume additionally that for each x ∈ X,
δ(t)f(Xxt )→ 0 as t→∞ Px-a.s., (4.2)
and
Ex
[
sup
t∈[0,∞)
δ(t)f(Xt)
]
<∞. (4.3)
Then, for any R, T ∈ E that are closed, we have
J(x,R ∩ T ) ≥ J(x,R) ∨ J(x, T ), ∀x ∈ X. (4.4)
Hence, R ∩ T also belongs to E.
Proof. Fix x ∈ X. Throughout this proof, for simplicity of notation, we define, for all n = 0, 1, . . . ,
the following:
1. τ0 := 0, τ2n+1 := inf{t > τ2n : Xxt ∈ T}, τ2n+2 := inf{t > τ2n+1 : Xxt ∈ R};
2. An := {ω ∈ Ω : τn(ω) <∞, Xxτn(ω) /∈ R ∩ T}.
Let v := ρ(x,R ∩ T ). By the definition of A1, we have
J(x,R ∩ T )− J(x, T ) = Ex [1A1 (δ(v)f (Xv)− δ(τ1)f (Xτ1))]
= Ex
[
1A1δ(τ1)
(
δ(v)
δ(τ1)
f (Xv)− f (Xτ1)
)]
≥ Ex [1A1δ(τ1) (δ(v − τ1)f (Xv)− f (Xτ1))]
= Ex [1A1δ(τ1) (E
x [δ(v − τ1)f (Xv) |Fτ1 ]− f (Xτ1))] (4.5)
where the inequality follows from (2.3) and f being nonnegative. The strong Markov property of
X implies that
Ex
[
δ(v − τ1)f (Xv)
∣∣∣ Fτ1] 1A1 = EXxτ1 [δ(ρ(Xxτ1 , R ∩ T ))f (Xρ(Xxτ1 ,R∩T ))] 1A1
= J(Xxτ1 , R ∩ T )1A1 . (4.6)
On the event A1, note that the closedness of T entails X
x
τ1 ∈ T . Thus, the fact that Xxτ1(ω) /∈ R∩T
implies Xxτ1 /∈ R. Since R is an equilibrium, by (2.6)
f(Xxτ1) ≤ J(Xxτ1 , R) on A1. (4.7)
With (4.6) and (4.7), (4.5) yields
J(x,R ∩ T )− J(x, T ) ≥ Ex [1A1δ(τ1) (J(Xτ1 , R ∩ T )− J(Xτ1 , R))] . (4.8)
In the following, we will carry out the above argument recursively. First, repeating the above
argument for J(Xxτ1 , R ∩ T )− J(Xxτ1 , R), instead of J(x,R ∩ T )− J(x, T ), we obtain
J(Xxτ1 , R ∩ T )− J(Xxτ1 , R)
≥ EXxτ1
[
1A(Xxτ1 )
δ(ρ(Xxτ1 , R))
(
J(Xρ(Xxτ1 ,R)
, R ∩ T )− J(Xρ(Xxτ1 ,R), T )
)]
, (4.9)
where
A(y) :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : ρ(y,R)(ω) <∞, Xyρ(y,R)(ω) /∈ R ∩ T
}
, for y ∈ X.
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Denote the expectation in (4.9) by I. By the strong Markov property of X,
I · 1A1 = Ex
[
1A2δ(τ2 − τ1) (J(Xτ2 , R ∩ T )− J(Xτ2 , T ))
∣∣ Fτ1] · 1A1 .
This, together with (4.8) and (4.9), implies
J(x,R ∩ T )− J(x, T ) ≥ Ex [1A11A2δ(τ1)δ(τ2 − τ1) (J(Xτ2 , R ∩ T )− J(Xτ2 , T ))] .
Continuing this procedure, we can get for all n = 1, 2, . . . ,
J(x,R ∩ T )− J(x, T ) ≥ Ex [1A1 . . . 1Anδ(τ1 − τ0) . . . δ(τn − τn−1) (J(Xτn , R ∩ T )− J(Xτn , U))]
where U = R if n is odd and U = T if n is even. Define
σn := inf{t > τn : Xxt ∈ R ∩ T}.
We can rewrite the previous inequality as follows: for all n = 1, 2, . . . ,
J(x,R ∩ T )− J(x, T )
≥ Ex [1A1 . . . 1Anδ(τ1 − τ0) . . . δ(τn − τn−1) (δ(σn − τn)f(Xσn)− δ(τn+1 − τn)f(Xτn+1))] . (4.10)
Denote by Hn the random variable inside the expectation in (4.10). We claim that Hn → 0 Px-a.s.
Let us consider the two distinct cases.
• Case I: limn→∞ τn =∞. Since σn ≥ τn by definition, limn→∞ σn =∞. By (2.3) and (4.2),
|Hn| ≤ δ(σn)f(Xxσn) + δ(τn+1)f(Xxτn+1)→ 0,
and thus Hn → 0.
• Case II: limn→∞ τn <∞. Set τ := limn→∞ τn. Since X is a continuous process, Xτn → Xτ . For
every n even, since R is closed, we have Xτn ∈ R by the definition of τn. This implies Xτ ∈ R,
again by the closedness of R. Similarly, for every n odd, since T is closed, we have Xτn ∈ T by
the definition of τn. This implies Xτ ∈ T , again by the closedness of T . Hence, Xτ ∈ R∩ T , and
thus τn ≤ σn ≤ τ . It follows that σn → τ . Thanks to the continuity of δ and f ,
δ(σn − τn)f(Xσn)− δ(τn+1 − τn)f(Xτn+1) → f(Xτ )− f(Xτ ) = 0,
which implies Hn → 0.
Now, by the fact that Hn → 0 Px-a.s. and
|Hn| ≤ 2 sup
t∈[0,∞)
δ(t)f (Xxt ) ,
we can apply the dominated convergence theorem to (4.10) as n→∞, thanks to (4.3). This yields
J(x,R ∩ T ) ≥ J(x, T ).
By switching the roles of R and T in the proof above, we can also obtain J(x,R ∩ T ) ≥ J(x,R).
Then (4.4) follows.
It remains to show that R∩ T is an equilibrium. Fix x /∈ R∩ T . If x /∈ R, by the fact that R is
an equilibrium and (4.4), f(x) ≤ J(x,R) ≤ J(x,R ∩ T ). This implies x ∈ IR∩T ∪ CR∩T . By (2.6),
x /∈ R ∩ T , and x ∈ IR∩T ∪ CR∩T , we conclude that x /∈ Θ(R ∩ T ). If x /∈ T , the same argument
gives x /∈ Θ(R∩T ). We therefore conclude that Θ(R∩T ) ⊆ R∩T . Since R∩T ⊆ Θ(R∩T ) under
Assumption 4.1 (see Remark 4.4), we have Θ(R ∩ T ) = R ∩ T , i.e. R ∩ T ∈ E .
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Remark 4.5. The closedness of R, T ∈ E is indispensable for Proposition 4.1. Particularly, it is
used to establish Xxτ1 /∈ R above (4.7), as well as “Hn → 0” in Case II of the proof.
In fact, without the closedness condition, Proposition 4.1 fails in a trivial way. For instance,
suppose Assumption 4.1 holds, and the payoff function f is strictly positive and satisfies (4.2)
and (4.3). We can construct two equilibria, without closedness, whose intersection is no longer
an equilibrium. Take R1 := X ∩ Q and R2 := X ∩ Qc. Since R1 = R2 = X ∈ E (Remark 2.2),
Lemma 4.2 (ii) asserts R1 ∈ E and R2 ∈ E. By construction, R1 ∩ R2 = ∅. Since (4.2) implies
J(x, ∅) = 0 < f(x) for all x ∈ X, R1 ∩R2 = ∅ is not an equilibrium.
The next step is to investigate if a countable intersection of equilibria is again an equilibrium.
To this end, we need the following technical result.
Lemma 4.3. Let (Sn)n∈N in B(X) be a non-increasing sequence of closed sets. For any x ∈ X,
lim
n→∞
ρ(x, Sn) = ρ(x, S∞) P
x-a.s., with S∞ :=
⋂
n∈N
Sn.
Proof. Take an arbitrary x ∈ X. The “≤” relation holds trivially, as Sn ⊇ S∞ for all n ∈ N.
To prove the “≥” relation, since it holds trivially when limn→∞ ρ(x, Sn) = ∞, we assume below
that limn→∞ ρ(x, Sn) < ∞. Define τn := ρ(x, Sn) for all n ∈ N, and set τ := limn→∞ τn. If
x ∈ S∞, ρ(x, Sn) = ρ(x, S∞) = 0 for all n ∈ N, and thus the desired result trivially holds. Suppose
x /∈ S∞. Fix ω ∈ Ω. For any m ∈ N, since X is a continuous process, we have Xxτn(ω) →
Xxτ (ω), and thus X
x
τn(ω) ∈ [Xxτ (ω) − 1/m,Xxτ (ω) + 1/m] for n large enough. It follows that
Sn ∩ [Xxτ (ω)− 1/m,Xxτ (ω) + 1/m] 6= ∅ for n large enough, and thus for all n. Now, since (Sn)n∈N
is a non-increasing sequence of closed sets, we can apply Cantor’s intersection theorem and obtain
S∞ ∩ [Xxτ (ω)− 1/m,Xxτ (ω) + 1/m] =
⋂
n∈N
(Sn ∩ [Xxτ (ω)− 1/m,Xxτ (ω) + 1/m]) 6= ∅, ∀m ∈ N.
By definition, S∞ is closed. We can thus apply Cantor’s intersection theorem again and get
S∞ ∩ {Xxτ (ω)} =
⋂
m∈N
(S∞ ∩ [Xxτ (ω)− 1/m,Xxτ (ω) + 1/m]) 6= ∅.
That is, Xxτ (ω) ∈ S∞. It follows that ρ(x, S∞)(ω) ≤ τ(ω), as desired.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose Assumption 4.1, (4.2), and (4.3) hold. For any sequence (Rn)n∈N of
closed equilibria, R :=
⋂
n∈NRn belongs to E. Moreover, for each n ∈ N,
J(x,R) ≥ J(x,Rn), ∀x ∈ X.
Proof. We can rewrite R as follows:
R =
⋂
n∈N
Tn, with Tn :=
⋂
i=1,2,...,n
Ri, n ∈ N.
By Proposition 4.1, Tn ∈ E for all n ∈ N, and J(x, Tn) is non-decreasing in n, for each x ∈ X.
For any x ∈ R, since x ∈ Tn for all n ∈ N, the fact that every Tn is an equilibrium implies
f(x) ≥ J(x, Tn), ∀n ∈ N. By (4.3) and Lemma 4.3, we may apply the dominated convergence
theorem and get f(x) ≥ J(x,R), which shows that x ∈ SR ∪ IR. Thus, R ⊆ SR ∪ IR, which
implies R ⊆ SR ∪ (IR ∩ R) = Θ(R). On the other hand, for any x /∈ R, there exists N ∈ N such
that x /∈ Tn for n ≥ N . Since Tn ∈ E for all n ≥ N , f(x) ≤ J(x, Tn) for all n ≥ N . By the
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dominated convergence theorem (thanks again to (4.3) and Lemma 4.3), we obtain f(x) ≤ J(x,R),
i.e. x ∈ IR ∪ CR. This, together with x /∈ R, implies x /∈ Θ(R). We thus obtain (R)c ⊆ Θ(R)c,
and can now conclude that R = Θ(R), i.e. R ∈ E . Finally, for each x ∈ X, since J(x, Tn) is
non-decreasing in n, we have
J(x,R) = lim
n→∞
J(x, Tn) ≥ J(x, Tn) ≥ J(x,Rn) ∀n ∈ N,
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 4.1.
4.3 The Main Result
Theorem 4.1. Suppose Assumption 4.1, (4.2), and (4.3) hold. Then,
R∗ :=
⋂
R∈E, R closed
R. (4.11)
is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. By construction, R∗ is closed and thus belongs to B(X). Set E ′ := {R ∈ E : R is closed}.
Since the indicator function 1R is upper semicontinuous on X for all R ∈ E ′, Proposition 4.1 in [2]
asserts the existence of a countable subset (Rn)n∈N of E ′ such that
1R∗ = inf
R∈E ′
1R = inf
n∈N
1Rn . (4.12)
It follows that R∗ =
⋂
n∈NRn. By Proposition 4.2, R
∗ is an equilibrium, and it remains to show
that it is optimal as well. For any R ∈ E , recall from Lemma 4.2 (ii) that R ∈ E . The definition of
R∗ then implies R∗ ⊆ R. It follows that
V (x,R∗) = f(x) ∨ J(x,R∗) ≥ f(x) ∨ J(x,R) = f(x) ∨ J(x,R) = V (x,R) ∀x ∈ X,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.1 and the second equality is due to Remark 4.3. This
readily shows that R∗ is an optimal equilibrium.
Remark 4.6. Condition (4.3) is necessary for Theorem 4.1, and more generally for the existence of
an optimal equilibrium. In Section 6, we will show that if (4.3) is violated, an optimal equilibrium
may fail to exist; see particularly Proposition 6.4 and Remark 6.2.
5 Characterization of Closed Optimal Equilibria
Theorem 4.1 shows that there exists an optimal equilibrium R∗, which is by construction closed.
Whether it is the unique optimal equilibrium has not yet been addressed. In fact, if we do not
impose any closedness condition on optimal equilibria, it is easy to see that uniqueness fails. Indeed,
under Assumption 4.1, any subset R of R∗ with R = R∗ is again an equilibrium (Lemma 4.2 (ii)),
with V (x,R) = V (x,R∗) for all x ∈ X (Remark 4.3). Thus, R is also an optimal equilibrium.
This section investigates whether R∗ in (4.11) is the unique closed optimal equilibrium. The
eventual conclusion is that R∗ in general is not the unique one, but other closed optimal equilibria
can only differ from R∗ in very limited ways. In addition, we propose a useful sufficient condition,
satisfied by many practical stopping problems, for R∗ to be the unique closed optimal equilibrium.
As the first step, we study the relation between an equilibrium and an optimal equilibrium.
Lemma 5.1. Let T ∗ ∈ E be an optimal equilibrium. For any R ∈ E, we have T ∗ \R ⊆ IR.
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Proof. Fix x ∈ T ∗ \ R. Since T ∗ is an equilibrium, x ∈ T ∗ implies f(x) ≥ J(x, T ∗), and thus
V (x, T ∗) = f(x). Similarly, since R is an equilibrium, x /∈ R implies f(x) ≤ J(x,R), and thus
V (x,R) = J(x,R). It follows that
V (x, T ∗) = f(x) ≤ J(x,R) = V (x,R). (5.1)
With T ∗ being an optimal equilibrium, the above relation must hold with equality, which implies
x ∈ IR. We therefore conclude T ∗ \R ⊆ IR.
When R∗ in (4.11) belongs to E , by the definition of an equilibrium (Definition 2.2), we have
(R∗)c ⊆ CR∗ ∪ IR∗ .
If it happens that the indifference region IR∗ does not exist outside of R
∗, i.e.
(R∗)c = CR∗ , (5.2)
then Lemma 5.1 already implies the uniqueness of closed optimal equilibria.
Theorem 5.1. If R∗ in (4.11) is an optimal equilibrium satisfying (5.2), then R∗ is the unique
closed optimal equilibrium.
Proof. By the closedness of R∗, (5.2) implies IR∗ ⊆ R∗ = R∗. Let T ∗ ∈ E be a closed optimal
equilibrium. In view of (4.11), R∗ ⊆ T ∗. On the other hand, Lemma 5.1 implies T ∗\R∗ ⊆ IR∗ ⊆ R∗,
which entails T ∗ \R∗ = ∅. We therefore conclude that T ∗ = R∗.
Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 together yield the useful result.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose Assumption 4.1, (4.2), and (4.3) hold. If R∗ in (4.11) satisfies (5.2), then
R∗ is the unique closed optimal equilibrium.
Remark 5.1. The condition (5.2) for uniqueness is satisfied by many practical stopping problems,
including those studied in Section 6.1 and Section 6.3.
In general, R∗ in (4.11) may not always satisfy (5.2), and there can be multiple closed optimal
equilibria. This is demonstrated in the next example.
Example 5.1. Let X be a one-dimensional Bessel process, i.e. Xt := |Wt|, where W is a one-
dimensional Brownian motion. Consider the hyperbolic discount function in (3.6). Let a∗ > 0 be
specified as in Lemma 6.1 below, and pick b∗ > a∗. Define the payoff function f : [0,∞)→ R+ by
f(x) =
{
x if 0 ≤ x ≤ b∗,
Ex [δ(T xb∗)b
∗] = Ex
[
b∗
1+βTx
b∗
]
if x > b∗,
where T xb∗ is defined as in (5.5). Note specifically that f is continuous, with f(b
∗) = b∗. Under
current setting, one may conclude from Theorem 4.1 that R∗ in (4.11) is an optimal equilibrium.
Observe that for any x ∈ [0, a∗), J(x, [a∗, b∗]) = J(x, [a∗,∞)) > x = f(x), where the inequality
follows from Lemma 6.1; for any x > b∗, J(x, [a∗, b∗]) = Ex
[
b∗
1+βTx
b∗
]
= f(x). This implies [0, a∗)∪
(b∗,∞) ∈ I[a∗,b∗] ∪ C[a∗,b∗], and thus [a∗, b∗] ∈ E.
We claim that R∗ = [a∗, b∗]. By (4.11), R∗ ⊆ [a∗, b∗]. If R∗ is not a connected set, one may
argue as in [10, Lemma 4.3] to reach a contradiction. Thus, R∗ = [a, b] for some a∗ ≤ a ≤ b ≤ b∗.
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If a∗ < a, then for any x ∈ [0, a), J(x, [a,∞)) = J(x,R∗) ≥ x, where the inequality follows from
R∗ ∈ E. This implies [a,∞) ∈ E, which contradicts Lemma 6.1 as a > a∗. If b < b∗, then
x > Ex
[
b
1 + βT xb
]
= J(x,R∗), ∀x ∈ (b, b∗).
This contradicts R∗ ∈ E. We therefore conclude that R∗ = [a∗, b∗].
Now, note that (b∗,∞) ⊂ IR∗, and thus (5.2) fails to hold. Moreover, T ∗ := [a∗,∞) is also a
closed optimal equilibrium, as
V (x, T ∗) = f(x) = Ex
[
b∗
1 + βT xb∗
]
= Ex
[
f(b∗)
1 + βT xb∗
]
= J(x,R∗) = V (x,R∗), ∀x > b∗.
In view of Example 5.1, it is of interest to investigate, when (5.2) is not guaranteed, how an
arbitrary closed optimal equilibrium T ∗ can differ from R∗ in (4.11).
To this end, take R ∈ E that is closed. For any x /∈ R, define
ℓR(x) := sup{y ∈ R : y < x} and rR(x) := inf{y ∈ R : y > x}. (5.3)
If there is no y ∈ R with y < x, we take ℓR(x) = inf X (which can be −∞). Similarly, if there is no
y ∈ R with y > x, we take rR(x) = supX (which can be ∞). Note that ℓR(x) < x and rR(x) > x,
thanks to the closedness of R. Let T ∗ ∈ E be a closed optimal equilibrium that contains R. Then
T ∗ \ R must intersect (ℓR(x), rR(x)) for some x /∈ R. To state a precise relation between T ∗ and
R, we will require the state process X to be regular in the following sense:
for any x ∈ int(X), Px(T xy <∞) > 0 ∀y ∈ X, (5.4)
where
T xy := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt = y} (5.5)
is the first hitting time of X to y from x, for any distinct x, y ∈ X. This is in line with the
formulation in Karlin and Taylor [15, Chapter 15].
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that (4.2) holds, X is regular in the sense of (5.4), and (2.3) holds with
strict inequality. Let T ∗ ∈ E be a closed optimal equilibrium, and R ∈ E be closed and contained in
T ∗. Then, for any x /∈ R,
(i) if (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ∩CR 6= ∅, then T ∗ ∩ (ℓR(x), rR(x)) = ∅;
(ii) if (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ∩CR = ∅ and f 6≡ 0 on (ℓR(x), rR(x)), then
T ∗ ∩ (ℓR(x), rR(x)) = ∅ or (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ⊆ T ∗;
(iii) if (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ∩ CR = ∅ and f ≡ 0 on (ℓR(x), rR(x)), then for any Borel subset A of
(ℓR(x), rR(x)), R ∪A ∈ E and V (y,R ∪A) = V (y, T ∗) = 0 for all y ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)).
Proof. (i) By contradiction, suppose T ∗ ∩ (ℓR(x), rR(x)) 6= ∅. Take z ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ∩ CR. By
Lemma 5.1, z /∈ T ∗, and we can thus define
ℓ(z) := sup{y ∈ T ∗ : y < z} and r(z) := inf{y ∈ T ∗ : y > z}. (5.6)
We must have either ℓ(z) > ℓR(x) or r(z) < rR(x), otherwise T
∗ ∩ (ℓR(x), rR(x)) 6= ∅ would be
violated. Also, by the closedness of T ∗, we have ℓ(z) < z and r(z) > z. Note that (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ∩
CR 6= ∅ already excludes the following cases:
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(a) ℓR(x) = inf X /∈ X, and rR(x) = supX /∈ X;
(b) ℓR(x) = inf X ∈ X (or ℓR(x) > inf X), rR(x) = supX /∈ X, and f(ℓR(x)) = 0;
(c) ℓR(x) = inf X /∈ X, rR(x) = supX ∈ X (or rR(x) < supX), and f(rR(x)) = 0;
(d) ℓR(x) = inf X ∈ X (or ℓR(x) > inf X), rR(x) = supX ∈ X (or rR(x) < supX), and f(ℓR(x)) =
f(rR(x)) = 0.
Indeed, in each of these cases, J(y,R) = 0 ≤ f(y) for all y ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)), thanks to (4.2). This
implies (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ∩CR = ∅, a contradiction.
Let us focus on the remaining cases:
(e) ℓR(x) = inf X ∈ X (or ℓR(x) > inf X), rR(x) = supX /∈ X, and f(ℓR(x)) > 0;
(f) ℓR(x) = inf X /∈ X, rR(x) = supX ∈ X (or rR(x) < supX), and f(rR(x)) > 0;
(g) ℓR(x) = inf X ∈ X (or ℓR(x) > inf X), rR(x) = supX ∈ X (or rR(x) < supX), and either
f(ℓR(x)) > 0 or f(rR(x)) > 0 (Assume without loss of generality that f(ℓR(x)) > 0).
Define τ := ρ(z, T ∗) and v := ρ(z,R). By definition, τ ≤ v. We consider the set
A := {ω ∈ Ω : τ < v},
and claim that Pz(A) > 0. If Pz(A) = 0, we have either “ℓ(z) = ℓR(x) and r(z) < rR(x)” or
“ℓ(z) > ℓR(x) and r(z) = rR(x)”. Assume the former, without loss of generality. Note that
Pz(A) = 0 entails T zℓR(x) < T
z
r(z) P
z-a.s. This, together with X being a strong Markov process,
implies that X, when starting from z, can never reach the region [r(z),∞), Pz-a.s. This, however,
contradicts X being regular in the sense of (5.4). With Pz(A) > 0, X being a regular process then
implies Pz
(
Xzv = ℓR(x) | A
)
> 0 in cases (e) and (g), and Pz
(
Xzv = rR(x) | A
)
> 0 in case (f). We
therefore conclude that in all these three cases,
Pz (f (Xv) > 0 | A) > 0. (5.7)
Now, we carry out the same calculation in (3.2), with x and T replaced by z and T ∗. In this
calculation, note that we now have a strict inequality
Ez [Ez [δ(v)f(Xv) | Fτ ] 1A] > Ez [δ(τ)Ez [δ(v − τ)f(Xv) | Fτ ] 1A] .
We get “>”, instead of merely “≥”, because of P(A) > 0, (5.7), 0 < τ < v on A, and (2.3) with strict
inequality. Then, the same argument in Lemma 3.1, below (3.2), can be applied here, which yields
the strict inequality J(z,R) > J(z, T ∗). Since z /∈ T ∗ and T ∗ is an equilibrium, J(z, T ∗) ≥ f(z).
Thus, we get V (z,R) ≥ J(z,R) > J(z, T ∗) = V (z, T ∗), which contradicts the fact that T ∗ is an
optimal equilibrium.
(ii) Since R is an equilibrium, (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ∩ CR = ∅ implies (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ⊆ IR. By con-
tradiction, suppose T ∗ ∩ (ℓR(x), rR(x)) 6= ∅, but (ℓR(x), rR(x)) is not contained in T ∗. Take
z ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)) \ T ∗, and define ℓ(z) and r(z) as in (5.6). Note that cases (a)-(d) speci-
fied above are again excluded under current setting. Indeed, in these cases J(y,R) = 0 for
all y ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)). With (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ⊆ IR, we conclude f(y) = J(y,R) = 0 for all
y ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)), which contradicts the choice of f . For the remaining cases (e)-(g) specified
above, the same argument as in (i) shows that V (z,R) > V (z, T ∗), which contradicts the fact that
T ∗ is an optimal equilibrium.
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(iii) For any Borel subset A of (ℓR(x), rR(x)), thanks to f ≡ 0 on (ℓR(x), rR(x)) and (4.2),
J(y,R ∪ A) = 0 = f(y) for all y ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)). That is, (ℓR(x), rR(x)) ⊆ IR∪A, which already
implies R∪A ∈ E . Recall from (ii) that R being an equilibrium and (ℓR(x), rR(x))∩CR = ∅ imply
(ℓR(x), rR(x)) ⊆ IR. Thus, we have V (y,R∪A) = f(y) = 0 for all y ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)). In particular,
if we take A∗ := T ∗∩(ℓR(x), rR(x)), then for all y ∈ (ℓR(x), rR(x)), V (y, T ∗) = V (y,R∪A∗) = 0.
Remark 5.2. The condition “ (2.3) holds with strict inequality” for Proposition 5.1 is not restric-
tive in practice. Most commonly-seen non-exponential discount functions, including those specified
under (2.3), satisfy this condition.
Recall R∗ in (4.11). For each x /∈ R∗, we define ℓ∗(x) and r∗(x) as in (5.3), with R replaced by
R∗. Any closed optimal equilibrium T ∗ can differ from R∗ in very limit ways, as stated below.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose that (4.2) holds, X is regular in the sense of (5.4), and (2.3) holds
with strict inequality. Let T ∗ ∈ E be a closed optimal equilibrium. If R∗ in (4.11) is an optimal
equilibrium, then for any x /∈ R∗,
(i) if (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) ∩ CR∗ 6= ∅, then T ∗ ∩ (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) = ∅;
(ii) if (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) ∩ CR∗ = ∅ and f 6≡ 0 on (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)), then
T ∗ ∩ (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) = ∅ or (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) ⊆ T ∗;
(iii) if (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) ∩ CR∗ = ∅ and f ≡ 0 on (ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)), then for any Borel subset A of
(ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)), R
∗ ∪A is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. By definition, R∗ is closed andR∗ ⊆ T ∗. The result then follows directly from Proposition 5.1
and R∗ being an optimal equilibrium.
Remark 5.3. One may wonder if Corollary 5.2 (ii) can be strengthened so that the possibility
(ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) ⊆ T ∗ can be excluded. If this could be done, Corollary 5.2 (i) and (ii) together would
imply that R∗ is the unique closed equilibrium, whenever f 6≡ 0 on any sub-interval of X.
This, however, cannot be done in general. Indeed, in Example 5.1, T ∗ \ R∗ = (b∗,∞) ⊆ IR∗ ,
which shows that excluding “(ℓ∗(x), r∗(x)) ⊆ T ∗” in Corollary 5.2 (ii) is not possible in general.
5.1 Comparison with the Discrete-Time Setting in [12]
In a discrete-time setting, Huang and Zhou [12] also establish the existence of an optimal equi-
librium, for an infinite-horizon stopping problem under non-exponential discounting. There is,
nonetheless, a key difference between the present paper and [12]. When defining the fixed-point
operator Θ in (2.6), we consider the indifference region, consistent with the iterative approach
originally proposed in [10]. By contrast, the indifference region does not play a role in [12]: it is
simply taken as a part of the stopping region. This simplification allows [12] to establish strong,
desirable results in discrete time, including (i) every equilibrium is closed, and (ii) there exists a
unique optimal equilibrium, under mild continuity assumptions.
While it is tempting to make the same simplification in continuous time, such a simplification is
legitimate only in discrete time. Specifically, if we ignore the indifference region in (2.7) by including
it in the stopping region, it will be questionable whether fixed-point iterations can converge to
equilibria (i.e. Proposition 2.1 may no longer hold). This goes back to the proof of the convergence
result [10, Theorem 3.16], which requires the use of the indifference region. In the discrete-time
setting of [12], the absence of the indifference region is salvaged by [12, Lemma 3.1], which allows
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a fixed-point iteration to converge to an equilibrium ([12, Theorem 3.1]), without the need of the
indifference region. Such a result, however, requires Θ(R) ⊆ R for R ∈ B(X). In continuous time,
this relation does not hold (see Remark 4.4), unless R is already an equilibrium.
6 Examples
To illustrate our theoretic results, we study three distinct stopping problems in this section. The
first one is the stopping of a Bessel process, investigated in detail in [10, Section 4]. We will briefly
present it, as it perfectly confirms Theorem 4.1. The second example is the stopping of a geometric
Brownian motion, while the third is an American put option written on a geometric Brownian
motion. These two examples demand a careful comprehensive analysis, which will enhance our
understanding, particularly, of the role of the integrability condition (4.3). In each of these three
examples, we will characterize an optimal equilibrium through an explicit formula.
6.1 Stopping of a Bessel Process
Consider a one-dimensional Bessel process X, given by Xt := |Wt|, where W is a one-dimensional
Brownian motion. The state space is then X = [0,∞). Let the payoff function be f(x) = x on X,
and the discount function be of the hyperbolic type as in (3.6). The expected payoff J(x,R) in
(2.5) then takes the form (3.7). Also, from standard properties of the Brownian motion W , one
can verify that Assumption 4.1, (4.2), and (4.3) are all satisfied.
As detailed in [10, p.82], the current setting relates to a real options problem in which the
management of a large non-profitable insurance company intends to liquidate or sell the company,
and would like to decide when to do so.
The next result presents a precise characterization of all closed equilibria, which is a direct
consequence of [10, Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4.4].
Lemma 6.1. R ∈ B(X) is a closed equilibrium if and only if R = [a,∞) for some a ∈ [0, a∗], where
a∗ > 0 is characterized by a∗
∫∞
0 e
−s
√
2βs tanh(a∗
√
2βs)ds = 1. Moreover, for any a ∈ (0, a∗],
J(x, [a,∞)) > x for all x ∈ [0, a).
Proposition 6.1. R∗ = [a∗,∞), with a∗ > 0 as in Lemma 6.1, is the unique closed optimal
equilibrium.
Proof. In view of (4.11) and Lemma 6.1, R∗ =
⋂
a∈[0,a∗][a,∞) = [a∗,∞). By Theorem 4.1, R∗ =
[a∗,∞) is an optimal equilibrium. Thanks to Lemma 6.1 again, J(x, [a∗,∞)) > x for all x ∈ [0, a∗),
which implies (R∗)c = [0, a∗) = CR∗ . Theorem 5.1 then asserts that R
∗ is the unique closed optimal
equilibrium.
Since the payoff function f(x) = x is strictly increasing, it is reasonable to focus on threshold-
type stopping policies [a,∞), as indicated in Lemma 6.1. The challenge here is how large a ≥ 0
should be, so that the resulting policy can be an equilibrium. Intuitively, if a ≥ 0 is too large,
the discounting involved 11+βρ(x,[a,∞)) may outweigh the payoff a obtained at stopping, reducing
the expected payoff J(x, [a,∞)) = Ex[ a1+βρ(x,[a,∞))]. Thus, anticipating that future selves will
follow too large a threshold a ≥ 0, the current self may decide to stop immediately – such that
[a,∞) cannot be an equilibrium. The main contribution of Lemma 6.1 is to provide a sharp upper
bound a∗ for the threshold a ≥ 0 such that [a,∞) is an equilibrium. Now, since the discount
function (3.6) induces decreasing impatience, the agent prefers smaller equilibria over larger ones;
see Corollary 3.1 and the detailed discussion below it. This readily shows, at least at the intuitive
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level, that the smallest possible equilibrium [a∗,∞) is optimal, which is rigorously established in
Proposition 6.1.
That [a∗,∞) is an optimal equilibrium can in fact be derived from [10, Proposition 4.10], which
was based on a direct calculation specifically for the current stopping problem. Here, we see that
our general theoretic results recover the same conclusion.
6.2 Stopping of a Geometric Brownian Motion
Consider a geometric Brownian motion X given by (3.5), with state space X = (0,∞), as well as the
payoff function f(x) = x on X and the hyperbolic discount function specified in (3.6). The expected
payoff J(x,R) in (2.5) then takes the form (3.7). The current setting describes the problem where
an agent, who discounts hyperbolically, wants to find a suitable time to liquidate the asset X.
Note that X satisfies Assumption 4.1, thanks to Remark 4.2. The conditions (4.2) and (4.3),
however, do not always hold. Recall the constant ν ∈ R defined in (3.8).
Remark 6.1. In view of (3.9), (4.2) is satisfied only when ν ≤ 0. On the other hand, (4.3) is
violated whenever ν > −1/2. Indeed, since ν > −1/2 is equivalent to µ > 0, for any x > 0,
Ex
[
sup
t∈[0,∞)
δ(t)Xt
]
= lim
T→∞
Ex
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
δ(t)Xt
]
≥ lim
T→∞
Ex [δ(T )XT ] = lim
T→∞
eµT
1 + βT
=∞.
The fact that (4.2) and (4.3) need not always hold poses a challenge to finding optimal equilibria.
First, R∗ in (4.11) is no longer a guaranteed optimal equilibrium, as Theorem 4.1 may not be
applicable. Even the fundamental result that the intersection of equilibria remains an equilibrium
is now in question, as Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 require (4.2) and (4.3) both. In the following, we
will deal with the cases ν > 0, ν ∈ (−1/2, 0], and ν ≤ −1/2 separately. We will see that results in
Section 4 can still be applied, after we modify our current stopping problem appropriately.
For ν > 0, an optimal equilibrium readily exists, thanks to Example 3.1.
Proposition 6.2. Let ν > 0. Then R∗ = ∅ is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. From Example 3.1, we already know that ∅ is an optimal equilibrium. Then R∗ = ∅, simply
from its definition in (4.11).
For ν ≤ −1/2, we first observe that any closed equilibrium has to take a specific form.
Lemma 6.2. Let ν ≤ −1/2. For any R ∈ E that is closed, R = (0,∞) or R = [a,∞) for some
a > 0.
Proof. For any R ∈ E that is closed, observe that R 6= ∅. Indeed, if R = ∅, (3.9) implies J(x,R) =
0 < x for all x > 0, which contradicts R being an equilibrium. Assume R 6= ∅, and take a :=
inf R ≥ 0. By contradiction, suppose there exists x ∈ (a,∞) such that x /∈ R. Define
ℓ := sup{y ∈ R : y < x} and r := inf{y ∈ R : y > x}, (6.1)
where the infimum is taken to be ∞ if there exists no y ∈ R with y > x. By the closedness of R,
we have ℓ < x and r > x, and thus ρ(x,R) > 0 Px-a.s. For ν ≤ −1/2, or equivalently µ ≤ 0, X is a
supermartingale. It follows that J(x,R) < Ex
[
Xρ(x,R)
] ≤ x, where the first inequality follows from
ρ(x,R) > 0 and the second the supermartingale property. This implies x ∈ SR, which contradicts
the fact that R is an equilibrium.
To understand the behavior of J(x,R), given in (3.7), we need the next technical lemma.
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Lemma 6.3. For any a > 0, define
κ(x, a) := Ex
[
a
1 + βT xa
]
for 0 < x ≤ a, (6.2)
where T xa is defined as in (5.5). Then,
(i) x 7→ κ(x, a) is strictly increasing on (0, a), with limx→0 κ(x, a) = 0 and κ(a, a) = a.
(ii) If ν ≤ −1/2, x 7→ κ(x, a) is strictly convex on (0, a).
(iii) If ν > −1/2, then limx→0 κx(x, a) = ∞, and x 7→ κ(x, a) is either strictly concave on (0, a),
or strictly concave on (0, x∗) and strictly convex on (x∗, a) for some x∗ ∈ (0, a).
Proof. By definition, κ(a, a) = a. Let p(t) denote the density function of T xa . Observe that
κ(x, a) = a
∫ ∞
0
p(t)
1 + βt
dt = a
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−(1+βt)sp(t)dsdt
= a
∫ ∞
0
e−sEx
[
e−βsT
x
a
]
ds = a
∫ ∞
0
e−s
(x
a
)√ν2+ 2βs
σ2
−ν
ds,
where the last equality follows from [5, Formula 2.0.1 on p. 628]. This particularly shows that
limx→0 κ(x, a) = 0. Consider
g(s, ν) :=
√
ν2 + 2βs/σ2 − ν. (6.3)
By definition, g(s, ν) > 0 for all s > 0. Observe that
κx(x, a) =
∫ ∞
0
e−sg(s, ν)
(x
a
)g(s,ν)−1
ds > 0 ∀x ∈ (0, a), (6.4)
and thus x 7→ κ(x, a) is strictly increasing on (0, a).
If ν ≤ −1/2, then g(s, ν) > |ν| − ν ≥ 1 for all s > 0. It follows that x 7→ κx(x, a) is strictly
increasing on (0, a), i.e. x 7→ κ(x, a) is strictly convex on (0, a).
If ν > −1/2, there must exist s∗ > 0 such that g(s, ν) − 1 < 0 if and only if s < s∗. Then
κx(x, a) can be re-written as
κx(x, a) =
∫ s∗
0
e−sg(s, ν)
(a
x
)1−g(s,ν)
ds+
∫ ∞
s∗
e−sg(s, ν)
(x
a
)g(s,ν)−1
ds. (6.5)
Observe that limx→0 κx(x, a) = ∞, as the first term on the right hand side above explodes, while
the second term vanishes. Moreover, from (6.4),
κxx(x, a) =
1
a
∫ ∞
0
e−sg(s, ν)
(
g(s, ν)− 1) (x
a
)g(s,ν)−2
ds =
a
x2
q(x), (6.6)
where
q(x) :=
∫ s∗
0
e−sg(s, ν)
(
g(s, ν)− 1) (x
a
)g(s,ν)
ds +
∫ ∞
s∗
e−sg(s, ν)
(
g(s, ν)− 1) (x
a
)g(s,ν)
ds.
We claim that q is strictly convex on (0, a). Indeed, a direct calculation yields
q′(x) :=
1
a
[ ∫ s∗
0
e−sg2(s, ν)
(
g(s, ν)− 1) (a
x
)1−g(s,ν)
ds
+
∫ ∞
s∗
e−sg2(s, ν)
(
g(s, ν)− 1) (x
a
)g(s,ν)−1
ds
]
.
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Since g(s, ν) − 1 < 0 if and only if s < s∗, each of the two terms on the right hand side above
is strictly increasing in x; specifically, the first term becomes less negative, while the second term
becomes more positive, as x increases. Thus, q is strictly convex on (0, a). By definition, q(0) = 0.
The strict convexity of q then entails either of the two cases: (i) q(x) > 0 on (0, a), or (ii) q(x) < 0
on (0, x∗) and q(x) > 0 on (x∗, a), with
x∗ := inf{x > 0 : q(x) = 0} ∧ a.
If Case (i) holds, then x 7→ κ(x, a) is strictly convex on (0, a), in view of (6.6). This, however,
contradicts limx→0 κx(x, a) =∞. Thus, we must be in Case (ii). Thanks to (6.6) again, if x∗ = a,
then x 7→ κ(x, a) is strictly concave on (0, a); if x∗ < a, then x 7→ κ(x, a) is strictly concave on
(0, x∗), and strictly convex on (x∗, a).
Proposition 6.3. Let ν ≤ −1/2. Then (0,∞) is the only closed equilibrium. Hence, R∗ = (0,∞)
is the unique closed optimal equilibrium.
Proof. For any a > 0, by Lemma 6.3 (i) and (ii), x > κ(x, a) = J(x, [a,∞)) for all x ∈ (0, a),
and thus (0, a) ⊆ S[a,∞). This implies [a,∞) /∈ E , for all a > 0. In view of Lemma 6.2, the only
closed equilibrium is (0,∞). Then R∗ = (0,∞), simply by the definition in (4.11). Since X satisfies
Assumption 4.1, we deduce from Lemma 4.2 (ii) that any R ∈ E must satisfy R = (0,∞). This,
together with Remark 4.3, yields V (x,R) = V (x, (0,∞)) for all x > 0, for any R ∈ E . Thus,
R∗ = (0,∞) is the unique closed optimal equilibrium.
For ν ∈ (−1/2, 0], a clear-cut characterization for closed equilibria as in Lemma 6.2 cannot
be obtained. Instead, we derive the following relation between different forms of closed equilibria,
which will prove instrumental in finding optimal equilibria.
Lemma 6.4. Let ν ∈ (−1/2, 0]. If there exist 0 < ℓ < r < ∞ such that (0, ℓ] ∪ [r,∞) ∈ E, then
[r,∞) ∈ E.
Proof. For any 0 < ℓ < r <∞ such that (0, ℓ] ∪ [r,∞) ∈ E , we must have
J(y,R) ≥ y, for all y ∈ (ℓ, r). (6.7)
For any y ∈ (ℓ, r), define τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xyt /∈ (ℓ, r)}, and let p : (0,∞) × {ℓ, r} → [0,∞) denote
the joint density function of (τ,Xyτ ). Then,
J(y,R) = Ey
[
Xτ
1 + βτ
]
= ℓ
∫ ∞
0
p(t, ℓ)
1 + βt
dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
p(t, r)
1 + βt
dt
= ℓ
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−(1+βt)sp(t, ℓ)dsdt+ r
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−(1+βt)sp(t, r)dsdt
= ℓ
∫ ∞
0
e−sEy
[
e−βsτ1{Xyτ=ℓ}
]
ds+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−sEy
[
e−βsτ1{Xyτ=r}
]
ds. (6.8)
Thanks to the formulas of Ey
[
e−βsτ1{Xyτ=ℓ}
]
and Ey
[
e−βsτ1{Xyτ=r}
]
in [5, Formula 3.0.5 on p. 633]
and ν ≤ 0, the above equation becomes
J(y,R) = ℓ
∫ ∞
0
e−sh1(s, y, ℓ, r) ds+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−sh2(s, y, ℓ, r) ds, (6.9)
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where
h1(s, y, ℓ, r) :=
(y
ℓ
)|ν| ( ry)
√
ν2+2βs/σ2 − (yr )√ν2+2βs/σ2(
r
ℓ
)√ν2+2βs/σ2 − ( ℓr)√ν2+2βs/σ2 ,
h2(s, y, ℓ, r) :=
(y
r
)|ν| (yℓ )√ν2+2βs/σ2 − ( ℓy)
√
ν2+2βs/σ2
(
r
ℓ
)√ν2+2βs/σ2 − ( ℓr)√ν2+2βs/σ2 .
Note that, by definition,
h1(s, αy, αℓ, αr) = h1(s, y, ℓ, r) and h2(s, αy, αℓ, αr) = h2(s, y, ℓ, r), ∀α > 0. (6.10)
For any α > 0, take R(α) := (0, αℓ]∪ [αr,∞). Observe that, by (6.10), the same calculation leading
to (6.9) yields
J(αy,R(α)) = αℓ
∫ ∞
0
e−sh1(s, y, ℓ, r) ds+ αr
∫ ∞
0
e−sh2(s, y, ℓ, r) ds = αJ(y,R), ∀y ∈ (ℓ, r).
This, together with (6.7), gives J(αy,R(α)) ≥ αy for all y ∈ (ℓ, r), which implies (αℓ, αr) ⊆
IR(α) ∪ CR(α). It follows that
R(α) = (0, αℓ] ∪ [αr,∞) ∈ E , ∀α > 0. (6.11)
Now, consider an auxiliary stopping problem with the current payoff function f(x) := x replaced
by f¯(x) := x ∧ (r + 1), for all x > 0. For any x > 0 and R ∈ B(X), the expected discounted payoff
is then
J¯(x,R) := Ex
[
δ(ρ(x,R))f¯ (Xρ(x,R))
]
= Ex
[
Xρ(x,R) ∧ (r + 1)
1 + βρ(x,R)
]
.
We will denote by E¯ the collection of all equilibria for this new stopping problem. The main purpose
of introducing this new problem is that since f¯ is bounded, (4.2) and (4.3) are trivially satisfied
(with f replaced by f¯), and thus Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1 can be applied to the new
problem. For any 0 < α ≤ 1, observe that
J¯(y,R(α)) = J(y,R(α)) ≥ y = f¯(y) ∀y ∈ (αℓ, αr),
where the inequality is due to (6.11). This implies R(α) ∈ E¯ for all 0 < α ≤ 1. By taking
α := ℓ+r2r < 1, we may conclude from Proposition 4.2 that
[r,∞) =
⋂
n∈N∪{0}
R(αn) ∈ E¯ .
It follows that J(y, [r,∞)) = J¯(y, [r,∞)) ≥ f¯(y) = y for all y ∈ (0, r), which in turn shows that
[r,∞) ∈ E .
Proposition 6.4. Let ν ∈ (−1/2, 0]. There are three distinct cases.
• Case 1: √βπ/2σ2 > 1. Then (0,∞) is the only closed equilibrium, for all ν ∈ (−1/2, 0].
Hence, R∗ = (0,∞) is the unique closed optimal equilibrium, for all ν ∈ (−1/2, 0].
• Case 2: √βπ/2σ2 = 1.
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(i) if ν = 0, then [a,∞) ∈ E for all a ∈ (0,∞). Hence, there exists no optimal equilibrium.
(ii) if ν ∈ (−1/2, 0), then (0,∞) is the only closed equilibrium. Hence, R∗ = (0,∞) is the
unique closed optimal equilibrium.
• Case 3: √βπ/2σ2 < 1. There exists v∗ ∈ (−1/2, 0) such that∫ ∞
0
e−s
(√
(ν∗)2 + 2βs/σ2 − ν∗
)
ds = 1. (6.12)
(i) if ν ∈ [v∗, 0], then [a,∞) ∈ E for all a ∈ (0,∞). Hence, there exists no optimal equilib-
rium.
(ii) if ν ∈ (−1/2, v∗), then (0,∞) is the only closed equilibrium. Hence, R∗ = (0,∞) is the
unique closed optimal equilibrium.
Proof. For each a > 0, recall the functions κ(x, a) in (6.2) and g(s, ν) in (6.3). A direct calculation
shows that ν 7→ g(s, ν) is strictly decreasing. Now, for any ν ≤ 0, by (6.4) and g(s, ν) being strictly
decreasing in ν,
lim
x↑a
κx(x, a) =
∫ ∞
0
e−sg(s, ν)ds
≥
∫ ∞
0
e−sg(s, 0)ds =
∫ ∞
0
e−s
√
2βs
σ2
ds =
√
2β
σ2
Γ(3/2) =
√
βπ
2σ2
. (6.13)
Note that in the above relation we have strict inequality for ν < 0, and equality for ν = 0.
• Case 1: √βπ/2σ2 > 1. For each a > 0, by (6.13), limx↑a κx(x, a) > 1 for all ν ≤ 0. This,
together with κ(a, a) = a (Lemma 6.3 (i)), implies that there exists x∗ ∈ (0, a) such that x >
κ(x, a) = J(x, [a,∞)) for all x ∈ (x∗, a), and thus (x∗, a) ⊆ S[a,∞). Hence, we conclude that
[a,∞) /∈ E , for all a > 0. This, together with Lemma 6.4, shows that (0, ℓ] ∪ [r,∞) /∈ E for all
0 < ℓ < r < ∞. It follows that (0,∞) is the only closed equilibrium. We can then argue as in
Proposition 6.3 to show that R∗ = (0,∞) is the unique closed optimal equilibrium.
• Case 2: √βπ/2σ2 = 1. For ν < 0, (6.13) gives limx↑a κx(x, a) > 1, for any a > 0. The same
argument as in Case 1 shows that (0,∞) is the only closed equilibrium, and R∗ = (0,∞) is the
unique closed optimal equilibrium.
For ν = 0, (6.13) gives limx↑a κx(x, a) = 1, for any a > 0. This, together with Lemma 6.3,
already implies that J(x, [a,∞)) = κ(x, a) > x for all x ∈ (0, a). Indeed, if κ(x′, a) ≤ x′ for
some x′ ∈ (0, a), then limx→0 κx(x, a) = ∞ (Lemma 6.3 (iii)), κ(a, a) = a (Lemma 6.3 (i)),
and limx↑a κx(x, a) = 1 would force x 7→ κxx(x, a) to change sign at least twice on (0, a), which
contradicts Lemma 6.3 (iii). Hence, we have (0, a) ⊆ C[a,∞), and thus [a,∞) ∈ E , for all a > 0.
By contradiction, suppose there exists an optimal equilibrium R ∈ E . By Lemma 4.2 and
Remark 4.3, its closure R is again an optimal equilibrium. Observe that R cannot be either ∅
or (0,∞). Indeed, (3.9) yields J(x, ∅) = 0 < x for all x > 0, which implies ∅ is not even an
equilibrium. Also, for any a > 0, J(x, (0,∞)) = x < J(x, [a,∞)) for all x ∈ (0, a); that is,
[a,∞) ∈ E generates larger values than (0,∞) on (0, a), and thus (0,∞) cannot be an optimal
equilibrium. With R 6= (0,∞), we can take x > 0 such that x /∈ R. Define ℓ and r as in (6.1),
with R replaced by R. By the closedness of R, we have ℓ < x and r > x. We claim that r <∞
and ℓ = 0. If r = ∞, then ℓ > 0 must hold, otherwise R = ∅. It follows that supR = ℓ and
J(x,R) = J(x, (0, ℓ]) < ℓ < x for all x > ℓ, where the first inequality is deduced from (3.7).
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This, however, shows that R is not an equilibrium, a contradiction. Thus, we must have r <∞.
Now, if ℓ > 0, then ℓ ∈ R, and thus V (ℓ,R) = ℓ < J(ℓ, [r,∞)), where the equality follows from
Lemma 4.1. This contradicts R being an optimal equilibrium. Therefore, the claim that r <∞
and ℓ = 0 follows, and we in particular have inf R = r > 0. If there exists x′ > r such that x′ /∈ R,
the same argument above shows that inf{y < x′ : y ∈ R} = 0, which contradicts inf R = r > 0.
Hence, we conclude that R = [r,∞). However, for any ε > 0, J(x, [r,∞)) = x < J(x, [r + ε,∞))
on (r, r + ε). That is, [r + ε,∞) ∈ E generates larger values than R = [r,∞) on (r, r + ε), a
contradiction to R being an optimal equilibrium.
• Case 3: √βπ/2σ2 < 1. Since ν 7→ g(s, ν) is strictly decreasing,∫ ∞
0
e−sg(s,−1/2)ds >
∫ ∞
0
e−sg(s, 0)ds. (6.14)
Note that the left hand side of (6.14) is strictly larger than 1, while the right hand side is strictly
less than 1. Indeed, by definition, g(s,−1/2) > 1/2 + 1/2 = 1 for all s > 0. It follows that∫∞
0 e
−sg(s,−1/2)ds > ∫∞0 e−sds = 1. On the other hand, as shown in (6.13), ∫∞0 e−sg(s, 0)ds =√
βπ/2σ2 < 1. Since ν 7→ g(s, ν) is continuous, we conclude from (6.14) that there exists
ν∗ ∈ (−1/2, 0) such that ∫∞0 e−sg(s, ν∗)ds = 1, i.e. (6.12) holds.
For ν ∈ [v∗, 0], since ν 7→ g(s, ν) is strictly decreasing, limx↑a κx(x, a) =
∫∞
0 e
−sg(s, ν)ds ≤ 1,
for any a > 0. This entails J(x, [a,∞)) = κ(x, a) > x for all x ∈ (0, a). If not, one may
argue as in Case 2 that limx→0 κx(x, a) = ∞ (Lemma 6.3 (iii)), κ(a, a) = a (Lemma 6.3 (i)),
and limx↑a κx(x, a) ≤ 1 would force x 7→ κxx(x, a) to change sign at least twice on (0, a), which
contradicts Lemma 6.3 (iii). Hence, we conclude (0, a) ⊆ C[a,∞), and thus [a,∞) ∈ E , for all
a > 0. This implies, as shown in Case 2, that there exists no optimal equilibrium.
For ν ∈ (−1/2, v∗), since ν 7→ g(s, ν) is strictly decreasing, limx↑a κx(x, a) =
∫∞
0 e
−sg(s, ν)ds > 1,
for any a > 0. One may then argue as in Case 1 to show that (0,∞) is the only closed equilibrium,
and R∗ = (0,∞) is the unique closed optimal equilibrium.
Remark 6.2. For ν ∈ (−1/2, 0], note from Remark 6.1 that while (4.2) is satisfied, (4.3) is not.
Hence, Proposition 6.4 in particular shows that an optimal equilibrium may fail to exist when (4.3) is
violated. One can also view this from R∗ in (4.11). In Case 2 (i) and Case 3 (i) in Proposition 6.4,
R∗ ⊆
⋂
a>0
[a,∞) = ∅,
and thus R∗ = ∅. However, R∗ is not even an equilibrium, as J(x, ∅) = 0 < x for all x > 0, thanks
to (4.2). In other words, the validity of Theorem 4.1 hinges on (4.3).
In this subsection, we show that optimal equilibria vary in forms and may fail to exist, depending
on the upward potential of the geometric Brownian motion X. Recall that ν in (3.8) measures the
upward potential of X. For ν > 0, X admits strongest upward potential (recall (3.9)). Anticipating
that all future selves will choose to continue (i.e. follow the stopping policy ∅), which leads to the
payoff J(x, ∅) =∞, the current self is more than happy to continue, too. This makes ∅ (i.e. “never
stop”) an optimal equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 6.2. For ν ≤ −1/2, X admits strongest
downward potential, such that the expected payoff from any slight continuation is lower than the
immediate payoff from stopping. The stopping policy (0,∞) (i.e. “never start”) is then the only
(closed) equilibrium, as established in Proposition 6.3.
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The most intriguing case is ν ∈ (−1/2, 0], where one needs to compare closely the mediocre
upward potential of X with the magnitude of discounting, measured by β > 0. If discounting
is severe enough relative to the volatility of X (i.e.
√
βπ/2σ2 > 1), discounting outweighs the
upward potential of X, such that the expected payoff from any slight continuation is lower than
the immediate payoff from stopping (similar to the case ν ≤ −1/2). The stopping policy (0,∞)
(i.e. “never start”) is then the only (closed) equilibrium, as shown in Case 1 of Proposition 6.4. On
the other hand, if discounting is not so severe relative to the volatility of X (i.e.
√
βπ/2σ2 ≤ 1),
a critical level ν∗ ∈ (−1/2, 0] comes into play, as shown in Cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 6.4. For
ν < ν∗, the upward potential of X is not strong enough to outweigh discounting (a similar situation
as above), and (0,∞) (i.e. “never start”) is the only (closed) equilibrium. For ν ≥ ν∗, the upward
potential of X outweighs discounting, to the extent that continuation until any threshold a > 0
is better than immediate stopping – such that [a,∞) is an equilibrium for all a > 0. Since the
discount function (3.6) induces decreasing impatience, the agent prefers smaller equilibria over
larger ones; see Corollary 3.1 and the detailed discussion below it. This means [a′,∞) is preferred
over [a,∞), for all 0 < a < a′. Interestingly, despite this well-defined “order relation” among
equilibria, there exists no optimal equilibrium. Indeed, any equilibrium [a,∞) is outperformed by
another equilibrium [a′,∞) with a′ > a, and the only hopeful candidate ⋂a>0[a,∞) = ∅ is not even
an equilibrium, as pointed out in Remark 6.2.
6.3 An American Put Option on a Geometric Brownian Motion
Consider a geometric Brownian motion X given by (3.5), with state space X = (0,∞), as well as
the payoff function f(x) := (K − x)+ on X, for some K > 0, and the hyperbolic discount function
specified in (3.6). The expected payoff J(x,R) in (2.5) then takes the form
J(x,R) = Ex
[
(K −Xρ(x,R))+
1 + βρ(x,R)
]
. (6.15)
The current setting relates to pricing of a perpetual American put option, under hyperbolic dis-
counting. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a real options problem where the management of a
company considers an investment plan, which has constant payoff K and stochastic cost evolving
as X, and would like to decide when to carry it out.
As mentioned in Section 6.2, X satisfies Assumption 4.1, thanks to Remark 4.2. Also, since f
is bounded, (4.2) and (4.3) trivially holds. Thus, Proposition 4.1, Theorem 4.1, and Theorem 5.1
can all be applied to this stopping problem.
For µ ≥ 0, a clear-cut characterization of closed equilibria can be obtained.
Lemma 6.5. Let µ ≥ 0. For any R ∈ E that is closed and contained in (0,K], R = (0, a] for some
a ∈ (0,K].
Proof. For any R ∈ E that is closed and contained in (0,K], set a := supR ≤ K. By contradiction,
suppose there exists x ∈ (0, a) such that x /∈ R. Define ℓ and r as in (6.1), with ℓ taken to be 0
if there exists no y ∈ R with y < x. By the closedness of R, we have ℓ < x and r > x, and thus
ρ(x,R) > 0 Px-a.s. This implies
J(x,R) < Ex
[
(K −Xρ(x,R))+
]
= Ex
[
K −Xρ(x,R)
]
= K − Ex[Xρ(x,R)].
With µ ≥ 0, X is a submartingale and thus Ex[Xρ(x,R)] ≥ x. The previous inequality then yields
J(x,R) < K − x = f(x), i.e. x ∈ SR. This contradicts the fact that R is an equilibrium.
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To understand the behavior of J(x,R), given in (6.15), we need the next technical lemma.
Recall the constant ν ∈ R in (3.8), and define
λ :=
∫ ∞
0
e−s
(√
ν2 + 2βs/σ2 + ν
)
ds > 0. (6.16)
Lemma 6.6. For any a ∈ (0,K), define
η(x, a) := Ex
[
K − a
1 + βT xa
]
for a ≤ x <∞,
where T xa is defined as in (5.5). Then,
(i) x 7→ η(x, a) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex on (a,∞), with η(a, a) = K − a and
limx→∞ η(x, a) = 0.
(ii) If a <
(
λ
1+λ
)
K, with λ > 0 as in (6.16), then x 7→ η(x, a) and x 7→ (K − x)+ intersect
exactly once on (a,∞), and the intersection takes place at some x∗ ∈ (a,K). Moreover,
η(x, a) < (K − x)+ on (a, x∗) and η(x, a) > (K − x)+ on (x∗,∞).
(iii) If a ≥ ( λ1+λ)K, with λ > 0 as in (6.16), then η(x, a) > (K − x)+ on (a,∞).
Proof. By definition, η(a, a) = K − a. Let p(t) denote the density function of T xa . Observe that
η(x, a) = (K − a)
∫ ∞
0
p(t)
1 + βt
dt = (K − a)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−(1+βt)sp(t)dsdt
= (K − a)
∫ ∞
0
e−sEx
[
e−βsT
x
a
]
ds = (K − a)
∫ ∞
0
e−s
(a
x
)√ν2+ 2βs
σ2
+ν
ds, ∀x > a.
where the last equality follows from [5, Formula 2.0.1 on p. 628]. This particularly shows that
limx→∞ η(x, a) = 0. Moreover, for any x > a,
ηx(x, a) = −K − a
x
∫ ∞
0
e−s
(√
ν2 +
2βs
σ2
+ ν
)(a
x
)√ν2+ 2βs
σ2
+ν
ds < 0,
ηxx(x, a) =
K − a
x2
∫ ∞
0
e−s
(√
ν2 +
2βs
σ2
+ ν
)(√
ν2 +
2βs
σ2
+ ν + 1
)(a
x
)√ν2+ 2βs
σ2
+ν
ds > 0.
Thus, x 7→ η(x, a) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex on (a,∞). This already implies that
x 7→ η(x, a) and x 7→ (K−x)+ intersect at most once on (a,∞), and the intersection, if exists, must
happen on (a,K). Observe that the intersection x∗ ∈ (a,K) exists if and only if limx↓a ηx(x, a) <
−1. Since
lim
x↓a
ηx(x, a) = −K − a
a
∫ ∞
0
e−s
(√
ν2 +
2βs
σ2
+ ν
)
ds = −K − a
a
λ,
limx↓a ηx(x, a) < −1 if and only if a <
(
λ
1+λ
)
K. Thus, for a <
(
λ
1+λ
)
K, the intersection x∗ ∈ (a,K)
exists, and we have η(x, a) < (K − x)+ on (a, x∗) and η(x, a) > (K − x)+ on (x∗,∞). For
a ≥ ( λ1+λ)K, η(x, a) is always above (K − x)+ on (a,∞).
The above lemma immediately enhances the characterization in Lemma 6.5.
Corollary 6.1. For any a ∈ (0,K], R = (0, a] ∈ E if and only if a ≥ ( λ1+λ)K, with λ > 0 defined
in (6.16).
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Proof. For any a ∈ (0,K], R = (0, a] ∈ E if and only if J(x, (0, a]) = η(x, a) ≥ (K − a)+ for all
x > a. By Lemma 6.6, this holds if and only if a ≥ ( λ1+λ)K.
For µ < 0, specific forms of closed equilibria as in Lemma 6.5 cannot be obtained. Instead, we
show that every closed equilibrium must contain a common subset.
Lemma 6.7. Let µ < 0. For any R ∈ E that is closed and contained in (0,K], we have(
0,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K
] ⊆ R, with λ > 0 defined in (6.16).
Proof. Fix R ∈ E that is closed and contained in (0,K]. By contradiction, suppose there exists
x ∈ (0, ( λ1+λ)K] such that x /∈ R. Define ℓ and r as in (6.1), with ℓ taken to be 0 if there exists no
y ∈ R with y < x. By the closedness of R, we have ℓ < x and r > x. Since R is an equilibrium,
J(y,R) ≥ f(y) for all y ∈ (ℓ, r). (6.17)
First, we deal with the case r >
(
λ
1+λ
)
K. Note that R′ := (0, ℓ] ∪ [r,∞) and (0, ( λ1+λ)K] both
belong to E , thanks to (6.17) and Corollary 6.1, respectively. It then follows from Proposition 4.1
that R′ ∩ (0, ( λ1+λ)K] = (0, ℓ] again belongs to E . This, however, contradicts Corollary 6.1, as
ℓ < x ≤ ( λ1+λ)K.
Next, we deal with the case r ≤ ( λ1+λ)K. For any y ∈ (ℓ, r), define τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xyt /∈ (ℓ, r)},
and let p : (0,∞)×{ℓ, r} denote the joint density function of (τ,Xyτ ). A calculation similar to (6.8)
and (6.9) yields
J(y,R) = (K − ℓ)
∫ ∞
0
e−s h1(s, y, ℓ, r) ds + (K − r)
∫ ∞
0
e−s h2(s, y, ℓ, r) ds, (6.18)
where the functions h1 and h2 are specified below (6.9). Observe from (6.15) and (6.18) that∫∞
0 e
−sh1(s, y, ℓ, r) ds < P
y[Xτ = ℓ] and
∫∞
0 e
−sh2(s, y, ℓ, r) ds < P
y[Xτ = r]. This implies∫ ∞
0
e−sh1(s, y, ℓ, r) ds+
∫ ∞
0
e−sh2(s, y, ℓ, r) ds < 1. (6.19)
Now, pick α > 1 such that αℓ <
(
λ
1+λ
)
K < αr < K. Define R′′ := (0, αℓ] ∪ [αr,∞). For any
y ∈ (ℓ, r), thanks to (6.10), the same calculation leading to (6.18), through arguments in (6.8) and
(6.9), now gives
J(αy,R′′) = (K − αℓ)
∫ ∞
0
e−sh1(s, y, ℓ, r) ds+ (K − αr)
∫ ∞
0
e−sh2(s, y, ℓ, r) ds.
This, together with (6.18), shows that
J(αy,R′′)− αJ(y,R) = −(α− 1)K
[∫ ∞
0
e−sh1(s, y, ℓ, r) ds+
∫ ∞
0
e−sh2(s, y, ℓ, r) ds
]
> −(α− 1)K,
where the second line follows from (6.19) and α > 1. As a result,
J(αy,R′′) ≥ αJ(y,R)− (α− 1)K ≥ αf(y)− (α− 1)K = K − αy = f(αy),
where the second inequality follows from (6.17). Since the above relation holds for all y ∈ (ℓ, r),
we conclude that (αℓ, αr) ⊆ IR′′ ∪ CR′′ . This implies R′′ ∈ E . Recalling that
(
0,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K
] ∈ E by
Corollary 6.1, we conclude from Proposition 4.1 that R′′ ∩ (0, ( λ1+λ)K] = (0, αℓ] also belongs to E .
This, however, contradicts Corollary 6.1, as αℓ <
(
λ
1+λ
)
K.
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Now, we are ready to present one single explicit formula for an optimal equilibrium, for any
value of µ ∈ R.
Proposition 6.5. R∗ =
(
0,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K
]
, with λ > 0 as in (6.16), is the unique closed optimal equi-
librium.
Proof. First, observe that (0,K] ∈ E . Indeed, since f ≡ 0 on [K,∞), one trivially gets J(x, (0,K]) =
0 = f(x), for all x ∈ (K,∞). This implies (K,∞) ∈ I(0,K], and thus (0,K] ∈ E . In view of (4.11)
and Proposition 4.1,
R∗ =
⋂
R∈E, R closed
R ∩ (0,K] =
⋂
R∈E, R closed, R⊆(0,K]
R. (6.20)
If µ ≥ 0, by (6.20), Lemma 6.5, and Corollary 6.1, we have
R∗ =
⋂(
λ
1+λ
)
K≤a≤K
(0, a] =
(
0,
(
λ
1 + λ
)
K
]
.
If µ < 0, then (6.20), Lemma 6.7, and
(
0,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K
] ∈ E (by Corollary 6.1) again gives R∗ =(
0,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K
]
. Hence, by Theorem 4.1, R∗ =
(
0,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K
]
is an optimal equilibrium. Finally,
from Lemma 6.6 (iii), J(x,R∗) = η(x,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K) > (K − x)+ for all x > ( λ1+λ)K, which implies
(R∗)c = CR∗ . Theorem 5.1 thus ensures that R
∗ is the unique closed optimal equilibrium.
In view of the payoff function f(x) = (K − x)+, one would like the geometric Brownian motion
X to drift below K > 0, generating strictly positive payoff. It is then reasonable to focus on
threshold-type stopping policies (0, a], with 0 < a ≤ K. The challenge here is how small a > 0
should be, so that the resulting policy can be an equilibrium. Intuitively, if a > 0 is too small, the
discounting involved 11+βρ(x,(0,a]) may outweigh the payoff (K − a)+ obtained at stopping, reducing
the expected payoff J(x, (0, a]) = Ex
[
(K−a)+
1+βρ(x,(0,a])
]
. Thus, anticipating that future selves will follow
too small a threshold a > 0, the current self may decide to stop immediately – such that (0, a]
cannot be an equilibrium. The main contribution of this subsection is finding the smallest possible
threshold, i.e. a =
(
λ
1+λ
)
K, such that (0, a] is an equilibrium, as shown in Lemma 6.5, Corollary 6.1,
and Lemma 6.7. Now, since the discount function (3.6) induces decreasing impatience, the agent
prefers smaller equilibria over larger ones; see Corollary 3.1 and the detailed discussion below it.
This readily shows, at least at the intuitive level, that the smallest possible equilibrium
(
0,
(
λ
1+λ
)
K
]
is optimal, which is rigorously established in Proposition 6.5.
The threshold
(
λ
1+λ
)
K responds desirably to the downward potential of X. Similarly to Sub-
section 6.2, ν in (3.8) measures the downward potential of X: the smaller ν, the stronger the
downward potential. It can be checked that λ > 0 in (6.16) is strictly increasing in ν, so the down-
ward potential of X can also be measured by how small λ is. Observe that λ1+λ is strictly increasing
in λ, with limλ↓0
λ
1+λ = 0 and limλ↑∞
λ
1+λ = 1. When λ is very small (i.e. X has strong downward
potential), one should take a stopping threshold close to 0, to fully exploit the downward potential
that can generate strictly positive payoff. This is captured by
(
λ
1+λ
)
K, decreasing to 0 as λ ↓ 0.
As λ increases (i.e. the downward potential of X weakens),
(
λ
1+λ
)
K also increases, reflecting an
inclination to stop earlier. When λ is very large (i.e. X has little downward potential), one should
stop once X drifts only slightly below K > 0. This is again captured by
(
λ
1+λ
)
K, increasing to K
as λ ↑ ∞.
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